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PROTECTING FACTFINDERS FROM BEING OVERLY
MISLED, WHILE STILL ADMITTING WEAKLY
SUPPORTED FORENSIC SCIENCE INTO EVIDENCE
Michael J. Saks*
"Washington state legislators, faced with 10th graders' declining achievement test
scores in math and science, are poised to just eliminate the tests altogether," according
to a Seattle Times Report. '
I. INTRODUCTION
If the students cannot pass the test, what is one to do? Answer: Get rid of the test.
The legislators of Washington State were not the first to think of this idea. Federal (as
well as state) judges, encountering a similar problem when applying the Daubert trilogy2
to the non-science forensic sciences,3 devised a similar solution.
The judges, however, have been more veiled about their solution, and they have
reason to be. A state legislature is constitutionally empowered to impose or to withdraw
a test as it seems reasonable to advance the health, safety, or welfare of the people. Not
so for a judge of an inferior federal court who wishes to ignore three unanimous4
Supreme Court decisions-which, with increasing commitment, direct lower courts to
conscientiously subject expert evidence to meaningful tests appropriate to the nature of
the subject matter, and to exclude any proffered testimony that is not able to meet the
test. But conscientious and straightforward application of those Supreme Court opinions
would have led to the exclusion of large segments of the non-science forensic sciences,
and that prospect apparently did not sit well with quite a few judges. 5
Many judges were surprised and puzzled to discover that the Daubert trilogy led
them to the brink of flunking large portions of a number of fields that had long ago
become familiar fixtures in the criminal courts. After all, the Supreme Court spoke of
* Professor of Law & Psychology, and Faculty Fellow, Center for the Study of Law, Science, &
Technology, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University.
1. Chuck Shepherd, News of the Weird, www.newsoftheweird.com/archive/nw070506.html (accessed
Mar. 26, 2008) (internal parenthetical omitted).
2. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. Forensic individualization sciences-fingerprints, handwriting, toolmarks, bitemarks, etc.-as well as
fire and arson.
4. As regards the core issues in the opinions.
5. Justice Scalia anticipated a certain amount of recalcitrance, and so in a concurrence to Kumho Tire
wrote "in a particular case the failure to apply one or another of [the Daubert factors] may be unreasonable,
and hence an abuse of discretion." 526 U.S. at 159 (Scalia, O'Connor & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
1
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the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules and their "general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony," while rejecting Frye's6 "rigid" requirements.
How could a supposedly easier test (Daubert) exclude fields that had presumably been
admitted under a more demanding test (Frye)?
There are several answers. Most of the non-science forensic sciences had never
been subjected to any formal test of admission, 7 so who knows how they would have
fared under Frye.8 Moreover, if one looks not at what Daubert says, but instead at what
Daubert does, the mystery begins to solve itself. In place of Frye's test of "general
acceptance," Daubert substitutes a test of "evidentiary reliability" (validity) of the
expertise's underlying claims. 9 For many questions, Frye and Daubert will properly
lead to the same result. But, on the one hand, where sound science has not yet come to
be widely known or accepted, Daubert will admit more readily than Frye, and Daubert
will appear to be the more liberal test. On the other hand, where a field came to be
generally accepted among its practitioners even though they had never gotten around to
testing their assumptions, Frye will admit more readily than Daubert, and Daubert will
appear to be the more rigorous test.
Few fields enjoy so much "acceptance"-within their own domain, among the
general public, and among lawyers and judges-while having done so little validity
testing, as do the non-science forensic sciences. Few contemporary fields of empirical,
material, observable endeavor have done so little testing, taken so much on faith, and
asked that so much of their offerings be taken on their ipse dixit, and yet have come to be
so widely well-accepted. It was inevitable that such fields would run into standards they
could not meet when the "general acceptance" test was replaced with the "evidentiary
reliability" test. The surprise and the problem result not from something odd about the
legal test being applied,10 but from our belated realization that some of the disciplines
being tested have not done their homework.
6. Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
7. See generally David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert
Testimony (West 2008); Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative Encounters
with Forensic Identification Science, 49 Hastings L.J. 1069 (1998). Interestingly, on the same day that Judge
Van Orsdel handed down his decision in Frye, he also handed down a landmark admission decision on firearms
identification, in which he did not bother to use the precepts he announced in Frye.
8. We have some hints. Two non-science forensic sciences that were formally subjected to Frye analyses
were bitemarks and voiceprints. People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100 (2d Dist. 1975). Bitemark identification
was found to satisfy California's version of the Frye test because the "tools" being used (casts, photographs,
etc.) were not at all novel, ignoring the fact that the use to which those tools were being put was altogether
novel, and notwithstanding then-widespread doubts among forensic dentists. Id. at 107-13. See also Faigman
et al., supra n. 7, at ch. 36; Saks, supra n. 7. Voice spectrography cases were an ideal poster child for one of
the common criticisms of the Frye test. The asserted expertise was admitted every time a gatekeeping court
employed the Frye test narrowly (that is, regarded practitioners of the craft as the appropriate reference
population whose acceptance or rejection was to be adopted by the court) and excluded the testimony every
time a broad Frye test was employed (that is, regarding the proper reference population to include, along with
practitioners of the craft, acoustical engineers, statisticians, linguists, and other fields which studied and used
voice spectrography). Faigman et al., supra n. 7, at ch. 37.
9. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579. The "overarching subject [of Rule 702] is the scientific validity-and thus the
evidentiary relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a proposed submission." Id. at 594-95.
10. If we accept the notion, as scientists (and, we had thought, society) have for quite some time, that-
when it comes to matters of general, observable, repeatable facts-proof of validity is better than the say-so of
a group of self-appointed, self-interested gurus.
[Vol. 43:609
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Weakness of the Non-Science Forensic Sciences
The non-science forensic sciences have not yet been able to establish the validity
and the limits of their most fundamental claims.11 As Giannelli and Imwinkelried have
commented, "all the areas of forensic science discussed in this article share two common
denominators: In each area little rigorous, systematic research has been done to validate
the discipline's basic premises and techniques, and in each area there is no evident
reason why such research would be infeasible." 12  Thus, their courtroom testimony
routinely exaggerates what they can know and what they can infer about the evidence at
issue. Thoughtful members of those fields, as well as observers from related fields, have
long been aware of this, even though popular culture and courts believe otherwise. In
this section, I will mostly allow those thoughtful observers to speak for themselves.
Fingerprint identification, the reigning champion of the non-science forensic
sciences, notwithstanding puffery in its sales pitches 13 and by its many fans in the
popular media, had long been recognized as unable to establish its most fundamental
claims with any existing evidence, data, studies, or theory which it possessed. Biological
researchers, after working diligently to try to prove that no two fingerprints could be
alike, concluded: "[I]t is impossible to offer decisive proof that no two fingers bear
identical patterns."' 14 Put simply, "the suggestion that recorded fingerprints are unique
has never been rigorously checked.",15  "It is impossible to prove any human
characteristic to be distinct in each individual without checking every individual, which
has not been done."'1
6
In response to the coming of Daubert, some government agencies began to look
into the problem of preparing some of the non-science forensic sciences for their
anticipated test of admission. Participants in the National Institute of Justice Fingerprint
Advisory Committee, which "included practicing latent print examiners, researchers, and
senior administrators from Federal, State, and private forensic science laboratories...
reached a consensus that the field needs ... [b]asic research to determine the scientific
11. See e.g. Faigman et al., supra n. 7, at chs. 32-37; William C. Thompson & Simon A. Cole,
Psychological Aspects of Forensic Identification Evidence, in Expert Psychological Testimony for the Courts
31-68 (Mark Costanzo et al. eds. 2006); Paul Giannelli, Forensic Science, 34 J.L., Med. & Ethics 310 (2006)(discussing the numerous concerns that have arisen regarding the use of forensic evidence); Erin Murphy, The
New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 Cal.
L. Rev. 721 (2007); D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge. The
Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 731 (1989); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan
J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 199 (2008); Michael
J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 Sci. 892
(2005) [hereinafter Saks & Koehler, The Coming Paradigm].
12. Paul Giannelli & Edward lmwinkelried, Scientific Evidence: The Fallout from Supreme Court's
Decision in Kumho Tires, 14 Crim. J. 12, 40 (2000).
13. See Simon A. Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification
(Harvard U. Press 2001).
14. Harold Cummins & Charles Midlo, Finger Prints, Palms and Soles: An Introduction to
Dermatoglyphics 154 (Blakiston Co. 1943).
15. David J. Balding, Weight-of-Evidence for Forensic DNA Profiles 54 (Wiley 2005).
16. Id. 3
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validity of individuality in friction ridge examination based on measurement of features,
quantification, and statistical analysis."' 17 More recently, an FBI Laboratory committee
assembled, inter alia, "to evaluate the fundamental basis for the science of friction ridge
skin impression pattern analysis" and concluded, once again, that "[e]mpirical studies
can never prove absolutely the hypothesis of uniqueness."' 18 Moreover, the committee
was "not able to find a single peer-reviewed publication that definitely addressed all of
the basic assumptions of friction ridge impression analysis."
19
David Stoney has explained how fingerprint examiners actually reach their
judgments of identity: "The criteria for absolute identification in fingerprint work are
subjective and ill-defined. They are the product of probabilistic intuitions widely shared
among fingerprint examiners, not of scientific research. This generally is
unappreciated."
20
How much correspondence between two fingerprints is sufficient to conclude that they [are
the same pattern]? ... An adequate answer ... is not currently available. The best answer
at present ... is that this is up to the individual expert fingerprint examiner to determine,
based on that examiner's training, skill, and experience. Thus, we have an ill-defined,
flexible, and explicitly subjective criterion for establishing fingerprint identification.
Any unbiased, intelligent assessment of fingerprint identification practices today reveals
that there are, in reality, no standards.
2 1
Because of the subjectivity and variability in standards from one examiner to
another, the FBI committee recommended that the quality of latents and their effects on
examiner judgments need to be studied: "[Q]uality/clarity, i.e., distortion and
degradation of prints, is the fundamental issue that needs to be addressed." 22 "There is
no defined quality metric, 23 for assessing the quality of a latent. Areas where the
committee believed research is most needed to develop objective criteria include:
Assessing quality of latents, image capture and quality (where no data were found to
exist), simultaneous impressions (where they found, among FBI latent print examiners,
"[c]onsiderable variation in the definition of simultaneous prints as well as the practices
for interpreting such evidence"), and criteria for making an exclusion.24 Relatedly, the
Inspector General of the Department of Justicehas called for procedural reforms which
"will require dramatic changes in the way latent fingerprint identifications are performed
17. Natil. Inst. Just., Forensic Friction Ridge (Fingerprint) Examination Validation Studies 3-4 (U.S.D.O.J.
2000) (available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/sl00 0 3 86 .pdf).
18. Bruce Budowle et al., Review of the Scientific Basis for Friction Ridge Comparisons as a Means of
Identification: Committee Findings and Recommendations, 8 Forensic Sci. Commun. § II.B (Jan. 2006),
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/jan2006/research/200 6 01 researchO2.htm.
19. Id.
20. David A. Stoney, Fingerprint Identification, in Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of
Expert Testimony 360 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., West 2008).
21. David A. Stoney, Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality, in Advances in Fingerprint Technology
327, 329 (Henry C. Lee & Robert E. Gaensslen eds., 2d ed., CRC 2001).
22. Budowle et al., supra n. 18, at § Ill.
23. Id.
24. Id. at § VI.
[Vol. 43:609
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in the FBI Laboratory and likely in other forensic laboratories as well."25
Similar realizations hold for non-science forensic sciences other than fingerprint
identification. Commenting on the broad domain of criminalistics, an FBI Laboratory
examiner writing in the Journal of Forensic Sciences noted: "[I]t must be observed that
there is no rational or scientific ground for making claims of absolute certainty in any of
the traditional identification sciences, which include fingerprint, document, firearms,
toolmark, and shoe and tire-tread analysis." 26
Two leading practitioners and researchers in forensic odontology reviewed the
literature of their field. They wrote: "This article presents a discussion of the scientific
basis for human bitemark analyses" and "[t]he review revealed a lack of valid evidence
to support many of the assumptions made by forensic dentists during bitemark
comparisons.
27
In the area of handwriting identification, strong advocates for the field conceded
the long-standing lack of evidence supporting its claims: There is an "admittedly sparse
history of carefully controlled empirical studies," and "there certainly has been a
shortage of studies . ,28 There is "an acute lack of empirical evidence on the
proficiency of document examiners" and therefore "it is widely agreed that testing of
professional document examiners and acquiring data on their abilities ... are
necessary." 29 "Document examiners have not done the kind of empirical research that
could have and should have been done." 30 "On that the critics are absolutely correct."3 1
There is "indeed a dearth of published empirical information relating to the proficiency
of document examiners .. ,,32
In addition to the absence of foundational studies informing the principles on
which examiners rely, absence of standards to which examiners must hew, and a free-
for-all of subjective discretion--examinations often are contaminated by examiners
knowing of other raw investigatory information, theories, speculations, expectations,
hopes, and desires, about a case they are working on. When one examiner checks the
work of another examiner, 33 the second examiner knows what the first examiner thinks
he or she has found. Such context information is known to systematically skew the
judgments of examiners, and is regarded as bad practice in most fields, but is standard
25. U.S. Dept. Just. Off. Inspector Gen., A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case 271
(Mar. 2006).
26. Stephen G. Bunch, Consecutive Matching Striation Criteria: A General Critique, 45 J. Forensic Sci.
955, 956 (2000).
27. Ian Pretty, I & David Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark Analyses-A Critical Review, 41
Sci. & Just. 85, 85 (2001).
28. Oliver Galbraith et al., The "Principle of the Drunkard's Search" as a Proxy for Scientific Analysis:
The Misuse of Handwriting Test Data in a Law Journal Article, 1 Intl. J. Forensic Doc. Examrs. 7, 7 (1995).
29. Moshe Kam et al., Proficiency of Professional Document Examiners in Writer Identification, 39 J.
Forensic Sci. 5, 778 (1994).
30. Michael Risinger et al., Brave New "Post-Daubert World"-A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 405, 411 n. 29 (1998) (quoting Moenssens) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Something that has come to be called "peer review" in an effort to make it sound as though the non-
science forensic sciences are meeting the Daubert requirements. 5
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operating procedure in the forensic sciences.
34
Champod and Evett-respectively, forensic scientists in Switzerland and Britain-
argue that "there is, at present, a major contradiction between the scientific status that is
claimed and the operational paradigm to which its practitioners subscribe" 35--due to the
field's rejection of conventional scientific criteria for thinking about, measuring, and
evaluating probabilistically the evidence with which they work. Though writing
specifically about fingerprint identification, they could be talking about all of the
disciplines that claim to be individualizing the source of markings and materials left at
crime scenes. Instead of asking courts to take the examiner's word for the validity of
what they offer the court, based on nothing more than their "experience," Champod and
Evett argue that "the scientist should, as far as possible, support his/her opinion by
reference to logical reasoning and an established corpus of scientific knowledge. This is
what we mean by 'transparency;' the former 'in my experience' justification we refer to
as 'obscurity.'
36
Forensic scientists and thoughtful prosecutors attribute the failure of forensic
science to develop its scientific foundations to the credulousness of the courts.
The uniqueness of friction ridge patterns, be they fingerprints, palmprints, or bare
footprints, has long been accepted by the scientific community and by the courts. The
reason for this widespread acceptance perhaps lies in the fact that fingerprints were first
introduced at a time in our history when society was less demanding of proof and more
trusting of authority. As a result of widespread recent challenges that friction ridge
identification, as well as other forms of personal identification evidence, lack a proven
scientific foundation, efforts have been ongoing to supply today's demands of validation
and verification that is... required by ... Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
37
Similarly, an assistant U.S. attorney, speaking at an FBI sponsored conference,
commented: "[T]he QDE [questioned document examiner] community [has failed] to
develop a rigorous empirical defense of its theories and methods." 38 He further stated,
"Daubert challenges prosecutors and the QDE community to work with scholars to
develop ways to demonstrate to courts ... that the basic principles of QDE analysis are
34. See generally Budowle et al., supra n. 18, at § lI.B. 1.
To reduce examiner bias a blind technical review comprising the ACE portion of the ACE-V
process should be carried out by another qualified examiner .... To be truly blind, the second
examiner should have no knowledge of the interpretation by the first examiner (to include not
seeing notes or reports). Such a technical review is absolutely necessary ....
Id.; Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous
Identifications, 156 Forensic Sci. Intl. 74 (2005); D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications
of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2002); Michael Saks, Context Effects in Forensic Science: A Review and Application of the Science of Science
to Crime Laboratory Practice in the United States, 43 Sci. & Just. 77 (2003).
35. Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J. Forensic
Identification 101, 101 (2001).
36. Id. at 106-07.
37. Andre A. Moenssens, Validating Friction Ridge Examination Techniques Proposals Solicited,
http://forensic-evidence.com/site/ID/ID_fpValidation.html (accessed Mar. 26, 2008).
38. J. Orenstein, Panel Remarks, Effect of the Daubert Decision on Document Examination from the
Prosecutor's Perspective (2d Intl. Symposium Forensic Exam. Questioned Docs., Albany, N.Y., June 14-19,
1999), in I Forensic Sci. Commun. (Oct. 1999), http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/octl999/abstrcte.htm.
[Vol. 43:609
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scientifically valid. . . ,39 The reason for this shortcoming is that "forensic document
examiners traditionally had not had any particular reason to conduct validity studies
because their testimony was being admitted without them.
4 °
Although these weaknesses might be news to courts, they are better known among
forensic scientists themselves, where concerns about Daubert had either been how to
prepare for the great test of validity4 1 that had been put off for so many decades, or how
to keep flying under its radar. An amicus brief, drafted by a consortium of law
enforcement groups, including forensic scientists, as the Supreme Court was preparing to
hear Kumho Tire, urged the Court to exempt from validity testing under Daubert
prosecution expert evidence,
the great bulk of [which] does not involve scientific theories, methodologies, techniques, or
data in any respect [but instead offers opinions] about such things as ... fingerprint,
footprint and handprint [identification], handwriting analysis, firearms markings and
toolmarks and the un iue characteristics of guns, bullets, and shell casings, and bloodstain
pattern identification.
Ironically, then, the same fields that had spent much of the previous century
claiming a place on the witness stand on the basis of their claim to being "sciences," now
sought to remain in court by arguing that what they do "does not involve scientific
theories, methodologies, techniques, or data in any respect."
4 3
Exaggerated belief in the forensic individualization sciences appears to play an
important part in erroneous convictions. Forensic science errors account for more
erroneous convictions than any source of evidence other than eyewitnesses.
44
B. Judicial Treatment of the Non-Science Forensic Sciences Post-Daubert
What do judges do when they come nose to nose with the shortcomings of the non-
science forensic sciences in the course of deciding a challenge to admissibility under
Daubert/Kumho Tire or similar state rules?
Recall the admissibility rules. In Daubert a unanimous Supreme Court held that
"[p]roposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation. 'A5 The opinion did
not regard this test as limited to "novel" forms of expert evidence, 46 and the implications
of that non-limitation were readily seen by courts which read the Daubert opinion with
any care.47 Moreover, courts were not to trust in the expert's claims of "experience"-
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic
Identification, in Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony ch. 29:35-29:47
(David L. Faigman et al. eds., West 2008) (outlining which fields within forensic science are vulnerable to
challenge under Daubert).
42. Br. for Ams. for Effective L. Enforcement et al. as Amicus Curiae at 15, Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137.
43. Id.
44. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 81 (2008); Saks & Koehler, The
Coming Paradigm, supra n. 11, at 892.
45. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
46. Id. at 592.
47. See e.g. U.S. v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999) (noting that the Supreme Court in Daubert
and Kumho Tire "is plainly inviting a re-examination even of 'generally accepted' venerable, technical fields"); 7
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the most frequent refuge of the non-science forensic sciences. The commentary to the
2000 revision of the Federal Rules cautions:
If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain
how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient
basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts. The trial
court's gatekeeping function requires more than simply "taking the expert's word for it.
' 4 8
Accepting the idea that there must be a demonstrably valid basis to an expert's
testimony, and that the opinions must rest soundly on that foundation, 49 does not appear
to have created any existential gatekeeping crises for courts in civil cases, as they
vigorously applied it to exclude experts proffered by the parties.
50
U.S. v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 554 (D. Md. 2002) ("[E]verything old is new again.").
48. Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory comm. nn. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,
1319 (9th Cir. 1995)).
49. "Nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion
evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert." Gen. Elec., 522 U.S. at 137.
50. See D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left
on the Dock? 64 Alb. L. Rev. 99 (2000) (outlining a statistical overview, finding that Daubert challenges are
both more common and more successful in civil cases than in criminal cases); see also e.g. Oddi v. Ford Motor
Co., 234 F.3d 136, 157 (3d Cir. 2000) (observing that, "[a]lthough Daubert does not require a paradigm of
scientific inquiry as a condition precedent to admitting expert testimony, it does require more than the
haphazard, intuitive inquiry that [the engineering expert here] engaged in"); Cook v. American S.S. Co., 53 F.3d
733, 739 (6th Cir. 1995) (reversing a trial court decision to admit expert testimony an expert qualified in testing
and failure analysis offered an opinion that a marine rope had failed from exposure to a torch, where the only
"test" performed by the expert "was to visually examine the frayed end of the [alleged defective] line with the
naked eye and under a low power microscope"); McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic, 150 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir.
1998) ("We have said before, and reiterate, that '[a]n expert who supplies nothing but a bottom line supplies
nothing of value to the judicial process."' (brackets in original)); Rudd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d
1330, 1337 (M.D. Ala. 2001) ("[Amended Rule 702] makes it clear that this court is now obliged to screen
expert testimony to ensure it stems from, not just a reliable methodology, but also a sufficient factual basis and
reliable application of the methodology to the facts."); U.S. v. Orians, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1173 (D. Ariz. 1998)
(stating that Daubert "does not require the court to limit its inquiry to those individuals that base their
livelihood on the acceptance of the relevant scientific theory. These individuals are often too close to the
science and have a stake in its acceptance; i.e., their livelihood depends in part on the acceptance of the
method."); Traharne v. Wayne Scott Fetzer Co., 156 F. Supp. 2d 690, 694 (N.D. I11. 2001) (following Daubert
that expert evidence must be "more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation" (quoting Daubert, 509
U.S. at 590)); Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 567 (N.D. Il1. 1993) (excluding plaintiffs
expert where the proffered witness "offered no testable design to support his concept"); In re 7T Boat Corp.,
1999 WL 694095 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 1999) (commenting on an expert who "did not use any scientific or other
technical methodology to arrive at his opinion. He, like Descartes, basically says, 'I think; therefore, it is.'
This is insufficient under Federal Rule of Evidence 702."); Reali v. Mazda Motor ofAm., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d
75, 80 (D. Me. 2000) ("All I have is [the expert's] assertion-unsupported by citation to studies, tests or
statistics ... That is not enough."); Saia v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 F. Supp. 2d 141, 148, 144 (D. Mass.
1999) (noting that, as "the Supreme Court recognized in both Daubert and again in Kumho, the ability to verify
a hypothesis is at the core of a court's inquiry;" in addition, rejecting the argument that an expert or an expert's
field are entitled to admission in the case at bar because they had been admitted in prior cases, commenting that
"numbers do not an argument make"); Kemp v. Tyson Seafood Group, Inc., 2000 WL 1062105 (D. Minn. July
19, 2000).
Both Daubert, and Kumho, make clear that the day of the expert, who merely opines, and does so on
the basis of vague notions of experience, is over. Experts are now held to a level of accountability,
that requires factual predicates, in historical fact, or in competent evidence, which allows a
factfinder to independently verify the accuracy of the expert's results.
Id. at *7; In re TMlLitig. Cases Consolidated ll, 922 F. Supp. 1038, 1046-48 (M.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd., 193 F.3d
613, 708 (3d Cir. 1999) (excluding the testimony of the plaintiffs' epidemiological expert based on research
design considerations; because the sampling selection criteria were unknown, the error rate was potentially
large); Mays v. St. Farm Lloyds, 98 F. Supp. 2d 785, 787 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (The expert "entirely fail[ed] to
provide a basis for his conclusion."); Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 721-26 (Tex.
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On the criminal side of the hallway, the picture has been quite different.
Thoughtful members of the forensic science community, and agencies that employed and
supported the non-science forensic sciences, recognized their shortcomings, worried
about their fate at the hands of judges armed with Daubert, and, in an effort to head off
their likely exclusion, began to undertake research in an effort to meet the
Daubert/Kumho standards. The courts themselves took a strikingly different view of
forensic individualization science's wares.
Some courts simply did not and do not see any problem. They have absorbed the
popular culture and have no idea how to evaluate empirical claims. These judges were
raised believing the unsupported claims of the non-science forensic sciences, and cannot
see beyond those blinders. They perceive no absence of supporting evidence; the mere
assertions of proponents are more than sufficient. Those judges hold a hearing or not,
and then think that the non-science forensic sciences look fine whether or not they are.
One of the clearest examples of this is provided by United States v. Havvard, in which a
Daubert challenge to fingerprint expert testimony was denied. 5 1 The court begins its
opinion on the Daubert motion by inadvertently revealing its own strong assumptions:
"The court's decision may strike some as comparable to a breathless announcement that
the sky is blue and the sun rose in the east yesterday." 52 Finding no research, data, or
other scientific basis for the claims of fingerprint expert evidence, the court looked for
other bases to try to justify admission, and it found them: For each of the Daubert factors
that the proponents of fingerprint expert evidence failed to provide, the court invents a
legal process substitute. For example, courtroom testing substitutes for scientific testing.
The fact of a history of admission in courts (general acceptance by judges, as it were)
fills in for the absence of research publications, of scientific testing, of results from such
testing. Where the experts made assertions that the court found non-credible, the court
replaced those assertions with its own more credible version. Following this curious
exercise, in which the court replaced the Daubert factors with its own shadow factors,
the judge declared this expert evidence to be "the very archetype of reliable expert
testimony under [Daubert]."5 3
Some courts fear what they might learn, and that they will not be able to find a
path around what they learned, and so they simply refuse to hold a hearing. 54 The most
forthright example of this might be one given by Judge McKenna who, as explained
below, found handwriting expert evidence to be sorely deficient, but nevertheless found
a way to let it in.55 With Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court closed off that evasion route.
When later asked what he would do if the same case came before him now, he answered
1998) ("Mechanical engineering is science" and the requirement of scientific validity applies to non-novel,
experience-based engineering testimony.); Werner v. Pittway Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1032 (W.D. Wisc.
2000) (The expert offered nothing but a "bare conclusion" and utterly failed to explain the reasoning process he
used.).
51. 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
52. Id. at 849.
53. Id. at 855.
54. U.S. v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
55. Id. at 1044. 9
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that he would not hold a hearing on the question; just let it in.56
Other courts do see the problem, but cannot bring themselves to apply Daubert in
any manner that would lead to exclusion of the evidence. As one commentator wryly
observed: "It seems that the only standard the courts are requiring of forensic science is
that it be incriminating to the defendant." 57 As we review a number of examples, the
reader is invited to contrast these to the treatment courts have given to civil cases,
illustrated in the margin, above.
United States v. Starzecpyze158 entertained a challenge to the admissibility of
asserted handwriting identification expertise. After a full Daubert hearing, the court
concluded: "Were the Court to apply Daubert to the proffered FDE testimony, it would
have to be excluded. This conclusion derives from a straightforward analysis of the
suggested Daubert factors . . . .59 "[F]orensic document examination constitutes
precisely the sort of junk science that Daubert addressed. 6 ° Despite these findings, the
Starzecpyzel court admitted the document examiner's testimony, reasoning that Daubert
was intended to apply to scientific evidence, forensic handwriting expertise clearly was
not science, therefore Daubert was inapplicable, and hence the testimony was
admissible.6 1 So "effective" was this reasoning that numerous other courts copied it in
dealing with challenges to asserted handwriting expert evidence in their own cases.
Kumho Tire put an end to artificial distinctions between science and non-science, holding
that all proffered expert evidence, whatever it might wish to call itself, had to
demonstrate its validity or be excluded, implicitly overruling Starzecpyzel and its
numerous imitators.
The claims of fingerprint identification experts have been challenged in dozens of
in limine hearings in recent years. With one exception, all of those ultimately resulted in
admission. At the same time, none of those courts was able to point to facts that met the
requirements of Daubert. In Havvard,62 as noted above, finding no scientific basis for
fingerprint expert evidence, the court replaced each Daubert factor with some trial
process factor. In another fingerprint case, United States v. Llera-Plaza (Llera-Plaza
i),63 the court acknowledged the gaping absence of empirical research testing the claims
of fingerprint examiners, saying: "I conclude that the one Daubert factor which is both
pertinent and unsatisfied is the first factor-'testing." '64  But the court admitted the
testimony anyway. Query, however, if there is no empirical research testing the
technique and its assumptions, what can be the basis for admission under Daubert: No
56. Lawrence M. McKenna, Panel Remarks, Science, Technical Knowledge, and Skill. Who Is an
"Expert?" (Natil. Conf. Sci. & L., San Diego, Cal., Apr. 15-16 1999) (copy of transcr available at
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/179630.pdf). Of course! Now that the test that would have to be administered
cannot be passed, don't give the test.
57. Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate Injustice, 15 Stan.
L. & Policy Rev. 381, 381 (2004).
58. 880 F. Supp. 1027.
59. Id. at 1036.
60. Id. at 1028.
61. One could characterize this reasoning as: "Heads it's in; tails it's not out."
62. 117 F. Supp. 2d 848.
63. 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
64. Id. at571.
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published peer reviewed research, no known error rates, and no basis for general
acceptance. The judge in United States v. Crisp 65took the view that the Supreme Court
could not have wanted the non-science forensic sciences to be excluded and therefore,
notwithstanding Daubert's apparent commands, soundness (validity, reliability) of the
evidence could not be the touchstone of admission. Consequently, given the serious
shortcomings in the scientific foundations of fingerprint expert evidence, the court
created alternative, less rigorous, criteria that would facilitate admission.66 Although the
majority of a three-judge panel reviewing a decision to admit fingerprint expert
testimony voted to admit on the ground that such testimony had been admitted for most
of the century, a dissenting judge, attempting to test the facts against the Daubert criteria,
concluded: "At ... trial the government's fingerprint identification evidence failed to
satisfy any of the Daubert requirements for establishing scientific reliability." 6 7  A
review of the many cases in which courts wrestled with challenges to fingerprint expert
testimony characterized those courts' opinions (in which they could not find bases for
admission that comported with the requirements of Daubert and Kumho Tire, but
nevertheless found various ways to rule the testimony admissible) as "a catalog of
evasions." 68 These included: reversing the burden of proof, ignoring Kumho Tire's task-
at-hand requirement, conclusory judgments with no analysis, substitute trial process
criteria for scientific criteria, relying on general acceptance, emphasizing flexibility of
criteria, and bringing the standards down to meet the expertise.
Some courts considering challenges to firearms identification testimony could not
find adequate basis for admission under Daubert, but still did not exclude the testimony.
One court commented that the examiner "conceded, over and over again, that he relied
mainly on his subjective judgment. There were no reference materials of any specificity,
no national or even local database on which he relied. And although he relied on his past
experience with these weapons, he had no notes or pictures memorializing his past
observations." 69 Another court noted: "[D]uring the testimony at the hearing, the
examiners testified to the effect that they could be 100 percent sure of a match. [Yet] an
examiner's bottom line opinion as to an identification is largely a subjective one, there is
no reliable statistical or scientific methodology .... 70
In a challenge to the admissibility of microscopic hair identification evidence, the
Kentucky Supreme Court purported to be conducting an analysis under that state's
version of Daubert.7 1 The record was devoid of research studies on the validity of
asserted microscopic hair identification expertise, so the Court relied entirely on the
"general acceptance" criterion of Daubert.72 But there was no evidence of that in the
record either. So the Court turned to its own earlier (pre-Daubert) Kentucky decisions in
65. 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003).
66. Sound familiar? If the student cannot pass the test, the test can be made as easy as it needs to be to
ensure that the student passes it.
67. Crisp, 324 F.3d at 273.
68. Faigman et al., supra n. 7, at ch. 32.
69. U.S. v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005).
70. U.S. v. Montiero, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 372 (D. Mass. 2006).
71. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 260-64 (Ky. 1999).
72. To this extent, the Daubert analysis became the equal of a Frye analysis. 11
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search of general acceptance of microscopic hair comparison. But not one of the earlier
cases admitting testimony on hair identification said a word about general acceptance of
the technique. So the Court stated that it would assume that those earlier decisions must
have: addressed the question, conducted an appropriate inquiry, and found general
acceptance. How else could they have admitted the testimony? 73 This case, more than
most, shows the lengths to which courts will go to admit asserted forensic science. This
Court had to create out of thin air the basis for admission under the weakest of the
Daubert prongs.
74
State v. Coon,75 a case involving a challenge to the admissibility of voiceprint
identification, was the Alaska Supreme Court's vehicle for adopting Daubert for their
state. One might have thought that on such an occasion the Court would be especially
cautious about what was required to be in the record and painstaking in its evaluation of
the record. The first time the case reached the Supreme Court, it remanded with
instructions to develop a more complete record so that the high Court would be in a
position to apply either a Daubert or a Frye analysis to the arguments for and opposing
admission (depending on whether it held that Alaska would remain a Frye state or
become a Daubert state). When the case returned to the Alaska Supreme Court, the
Court first adopted Daubert as the new expert evidence admissibility test. 76 But the
court below had failed to supplement the record with evidence that might have informed
a Daubert analysis because it had been offered no scientific evidence by the parties, had
demanded none, and did no research of its own. 77 An ironic state of affairs considering
that for voice spectrography, unlike most other forensic identification techniques, there is
a substantial scientific literature upon which to draw. 78 The Alaska Supreme Court did
not appear to mind at all. It conducted a limited and superficial review of the record and
the research on which one would expect a Daubert decision to depend, doing little more
than quoting the trial court's conclusory assertions, and then declared voiceprint expert
evidence to meet its new standard.
In short, courts have found a multitude of ways to avoid the outcomes Daubert
would have led to, had it been applied conscientiously to the reality of the non-science
forensic sciences.
C. An Alternative History
What might history have looked like if these various courts had conscientiously
73. The court must have assumed that Frye was in effect and that its predecessor courts were following
Frye. What the court did not realize was that Frye had not been adopted, or even mentioned, in Kentucky, until
after those cases were decided. See Michael J. Saks, Johnson v. Commonwealth: How Dependable is
Identification by Microscopic Hair Comparison, 26 Advoc. J. Crim. Just. Educ. & Res. 14 (2004).
74. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that general acceptance, with nothing else, would not suffice for
admission in federal courts. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151.
75. 974 P.2d 386, 388 (Alaska 1999).
76. Id. Interestingly, in favor of retaining the Frye test, the government made two arguments: One, that the
Daubert standard is so low that it will lead to the admission of junk science and, two, that the Daubert standard
is so high that it will exclude forensic science. The only way both arguments can exist coherently is if the
government believes junk science is superior to forensic science. Id. at 388-89.
77. Permissible when a court is searching for legislative facts. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 advisory comm. nn.
78. Faigman et al., supra n. 7, at ch. 37.
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applied the Daubert trilogy to the facts about the expert evidence before the court, and
followed the law where it led? That portions of some or many of the non-science
forensic sciences would have been excluded (or sharply limited) is a conclusion that
seems hard to avoid. If it were possible to apply the Daubert trilogy and find the areas of
expert evidence we have been discussing admissible on Daubert/Kumho grounds, surely
the numerous courts reviewing numerous areas of forensic science would have written
those opinions that would have persuasively explained why these fields pass Daubert
muster, rather than the evasive ones they did write.
Such outcomes are not impossible. There have been moments when judges have
appreciated the shortcomings of the non-science forensic sciences and followed Daubert
where it led.79 Had those decisions been the dominant judicial response, what might that
have led to?
Suppose judges had simply excluded certain tasks-at-hand of certain forensic
sciences when the proffered expert testimony did not meet the requisite admissibility
standards? 80  In such an event, forensic science organizations and their government
sponsors and supporters would have leaped into action, seeing to it that studies were
conducted testing the claims of the expert fields so that they could establish their
admissibility and return to court. At some level this is exactly what started to happen
when Daubert, and then Kumho Tire, were decided. Task forces formed, agencies
prepared requests for proposals, and some research projects were begun. 81 When these
agencies realized that the courts were not serious about subjecting the non-science
forensic sciences to Daubert scrutiny, the efforts faded almost as quickly as they had
blossomed.
Thus, what the courts exclude or accept has the effect of prompting or subduing
research. Were such research projects carried on in sufficient depth and breadth, and
with the sincerity of scientific inquiry,8 2 the result would be a body of data that revealed
what claims are more and what claims are less valid-ideally a map, of sorts, which
showed courts which areas of the formerly non-science forensic sciences could be relied
upon to provide what level of dependability. With such information, courts could make
79. U.S. v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Alaska 2001); U.S. v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Ill.
2000); U.S. v. Llera Plaza (Llera Plaza 1), 2002 WL 27305 at * 11 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated and superseded,
Lera Plaza I1, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549; State v. Rose, K06-0545 (Md. Cir. Bait. Co. 2007); and perhaps the
numerous courts that followed the example of Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 73, and only partially admitted the
proffered expert evidence.
80. A variation on this is that courts might have declared a date certain (five or ten years, say) beyond
which exclusion would occur if the fields had not by then undertaken research which succeeded in establishing
their admissibility under the rules of evidence. This approach offers certain obvious benefits (e.g., leaves the
status quo intact, but sends a powerful message that the courts are going to start expecting something of greater
substance from these fields) and certain obvious complications (convictions occurring during this interregnum
might have to be revisited if it later tumed out that the evidence which had been admitted was inadmissible and
that without it no reasonable jury could have convicted). Moreover, the only way the courts of a jurisdiction
could manage such an approach in a coordinated fashion would be if the highest appellate court in the
jurisdiction imposed the interregnum, probably on appeal of such a decision by a trial court.
81. For example, consider the RFPs promulgated by the NIJ. See Natil. Inst. Just., supra n. 17.
82. And not merely to manufacture pseudo-scientific evidence designed to support predetermined
conclusions (like a pharmaceutical company that funds research with the understanding that the research must
be designed or the data massaged or the results interpreted so as to keep the company's product on the market).
See e.g. D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, A House with No Foundation, 20 Issues Sci. & Tech. 35
(2003). 13
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informed and sensible decisions about what to admit, what to admit with cautions to the
factfinder, and what to exclude.
III. SUGGESTED JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR SURRENDERING TO THE IMPULSE TO ADMIT
NON-SCIENCE FORENSIC SCIENCE WITHOUT FORSAKING THE LEGAL POLICY
UNDERLYING RULE 702
We can assume that harmony will some day come to the law of admissibility of
expert evidence. Either the courts will get around to following the rule 83 or the rule will
be changed to reflect what judges are comfortable deciding. 84
In the meantime, judges feel a strong-for most, an irresistible-impulse to admit
the non-science forensic sciences regardless of what the evidence on the evidence
teaches them about it. Whatever the reason, in criminal cases, most judges respond to
government proffers of non-science forensic science, no matter how weak it is,
regardless of the circumstances, by admitting the testimony.
Can something constructive be accomplished? Can ways be found to balance the
need judges feel to allow the testimony and the law's interest in preventing exaggerated,
assertedly "scientific," claims to be presented entered as evidence? Can we resolve the
conflict without doing violence to either their intuitions of the judges or the rights of
defendants to have evidence offered against them that is not misleading, exaggerated,
false?
This final section presents a set of possible actions judges can take, short of
exclusion, to manage expert testimony from the non-science forensic sciences in ways
that might help achieve the needed balance.
A. Partial Admission
Courts that have employed partial admission allow the expert witness to testify
concerning observable things, which the expert is presumed to be a better observer of
than the jury, but the expert witness is barred from offering inferences about the meaning
of what has been observed, leaving that to the jury. The rationale is that the expert's
field has not established its expertise in drawing those inferences, or a sound basis for
drawing them.85 For example, a handwriting examiner would be permitted to describe
features of the questioned and known writing but would not be permitted to assert an
opinion on whether the defendant was the source of the questioned writing. In essence,
this is a bar on ultimate issue testimony by fields which have not established their ability
under Daubert to draw accurate inferences.
Relatedly, courts could (and should) prohibit assertions of unique
individualization, because such claims go beyond the actual knowledge and capabilities
83. Leading to something like the alternative history described in the preceding section.
84. Much as the Washington legislature did with student testing, but this time by a body authorized to
change Rule 702, rather than by individual judges evading Rule 702.
85. This method has been used in Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 106-07 (firearms identification); Hines, 55 F.
Supp. 2d at 63 (handwriting); and Lera Plaza 1, 2002 WL 27305 at *I I (fingerprints). In the instance of
handwriting expert testimony, this technique has been followed by numerous other courts.
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of any field, 86 and courts could (and should) bar ultimate conclusions of identity. 87
B. Require That Examinations Be Conducted Using Blind Testing and Evidence
Lineups
Although the forensic science field does not protect examiners from extraneous
and potentially misleading and biasing information, courts could require that
examinations have been conducted blind or their results be barred.88 Blind testing is
common not only in many other fields of science (where blind and double-blind
procedures are the norm in scientific research) but in such everyday activities as blind
taste tests, blind grading, blind review by peer-reviewed journals, and so on. The failure
to use blind testing is responsible for errors in which examiners inadvertently or
deliberately take account of information not needed to make their judgments. Moreover,
the use of blind testing would prevent fraudulent reports and testimony by examiners,
because if they do not know what results are "needed" by investigators, they cannot
manufacture them. A legally imposed requirement of blind testing would protect
examiners from information that contaminates their work, and protect courts from
examiners who have been tainted.
Blind examination is an important step, but more is needed. Where only a single
suspect has been developed in a case, it is obvious who the suspect is, implying that
inclusion of that person or object is the desired or expected results. These are the parallel
of show-ups in the eyewitness context. Evidence lineups would be superior procedures
to evidence show-ups for the same reasons that eyewitness lineups are considered
superior to eyewitness show-ups.
C. Require That the Examiner and Lab Be Certified
Certification by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory
Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB) provides partial assurance that competent work is
being done. Like all certification programs, the review itself has the limitations of
whatever it chooses to look at and how well it looks. For example, ASCLD/LAB
certification overlooks any requirement of blind (or masked) examination because the
field of forensic science has never adopted such procedures, even though their value is
well recognized in many conventional scientific fields. Moreover, the certification does
not assure that any given examiner in any given case does everything properly and
reaches accurate conclusions. But laboratories and examiners with certification are
generally likely to be doing better work than laboratories without certification.
86. Saks & Koehler, supra n. 11.
87. Fed. R. Evid. 704(b) does this categorically for ultimate issue expert testimony on mental states
constituting an element of a crime or defense to a crime.
88. Extensive discussion of blind testing can be found in Risinger et al., supra note 34, at 45-47. See also
Paul C. Giannelli, Confirmation Bias, 22 Crim. Just. 60 (Fall 2007). 15
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D. Require Experts to Stay Firmly Within the Bounds of What Their Field Actually
Knows
In important ways, testimony by examiners in various forensic individualization
sciences regularly steps outside of the zone of what the field actually knows and can
support. Courts have come to accept, without ever having asked for or received proof,
that examiners can do what they claim to be able to do.89 If courts closely scrutinized
the claims being made or implicit in their testimony, and permitted experts to testify only
to that which they could satisfactorily support with sound bases, less would be testified
to, but what the factfinder was told would be more dependable.
90
E. Prohibit Overpowering and Exaggerated Terminology
The way a forensic science expert witness presents testimony can affect the
factfinder's understanding of what conclusions the evidence can and cannot support.
Some subfields of forensic science, and some individual witnesses, use
terminology that sounds as though it admits of no conclusion except the certain positive
identification advocated by the witness, when such conclusions are unsupportable (on
scientific grounds) in any field of forensic science. One field insists that its practitioners
use terminology that is absolute, categorically concluding that an "identification" either
exists or does not (or that no opinion can be reached), when, ironically, only a
probabilistic statement-and a subjective probability estimate at that-could accurately
reflect the real basis of the judgment the examiner has made.
Some subfields use terms that do not readily convey to laypersons what the
examiner intends. For example, if a forensic dentist states that in his opinion a "match"
has been found between the bite mark in a victim and the defendant's dentition, the jury
is likely understand that to mean that the defendant is the biter. But, for forensic dentists,
the actual meaning of a match is: "[S]ome degree of concordance ... similarity" but no
"expression of ... specificity" intended; generally similar but true for "a large
percentage of the population. ' 91 Other fields' experts might use the word "match" to
mean a very strong probability of common source, but the judge or jury may well think it
means an even more certain linkage than intended or supportable. A "match" merely
indicates that two marks or objects appear indistinguishably alike. A second step must
be performed to interpret the likelihood that two things that "match" originated from the
same source.
Overreaching and exaggeration should be banned from the witness box. Any
expression of absolute certainty by forensic identification experts, or any term likely to
be understood by the fact finder as conveying such a strong and unjustifiable meaning,
should be prohibited. Among such suspect terms would be "identification," "match,"
"unique,". "no other in the world," "identification to the exclusion of all others in the
89. See e.g. Risinger et al., supra n. 11; Saks, supra n. 7.
90. This is the more general principle of what is expressed supra note 85 and accompanying text.
91. Am. Bd. Forensic Odontology, ABFO Bitemark Guidelines, http://www.forensicdentistryonline.org/
Forensic_pages_ 1/bitemark guidelines.htm#ABFO%20Bitemark%20Methodology%20Guidelines (accessed
Mar. 27, 2008).
[Vol. 43:609
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 43 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss2/13
2007] PROTECTING FACTFINDERS FROM BEING OVERLYMISLED 625
world," and "consistent with."
F. Jury Instructions about the Limits of a Field's Expertise
Some courts have decided that if shaky but admissible expert forensic evidence
comes before the jury, the jury should be instructed in a manner that allows it to put the
evidence in proper perspective. One example is the court in Starzecpyzel,92 which
concluded that handwriting identification was junk science, but decided to admit it
anyway. In an effort to offset the impact of a "scientist's expert" testimony, the court
also fashioned an instruction to the jury in an effort to temper the effects the testimony
might have. The court explained to the jury that forensic document examiners are not
scientists per se but are more akin to craftsmen, and that their testimony may be less
precise than, perhaps, a chemist's.
The concern that jurors might overvalue forensic science expert opinion is at the
heart of the rules of evidence, which set higher thresholds for the admission of expert
testimony. If the testimony is admitted despite the fact that jurors (as well as judges)
have exaggerated beliefs in its soundness at the same time that it cannot persuasively
demonstrate its validity, the problem can be ameliorated somewhat by an appropriate
instruction. Of course, the court has to properly understand the nature of the field and
the evidence before it, and their limitations, in order to draft such an instruction.
G. Use of Court-Appointed Experts and Panels of Experts
The law does not limit judges to hearing from only the experts offered by the
parties. In appropriate circumstances, such as deciding whether or how much evidence
to admit, judges have the power to obtain help from additional experts. By rule or by
their common-law powers, all courts have the authority to appoint their own expert
witnesses or panels of experts; 93 some have the authority to appoint advisory juries.94
Many also have the authority to appoint consulting experts (that is, experts who will
assist the judge in deciding, more akin to a confidential aide than as a witness). Given
the myriad forms of forensic science and the number of challenges raised to such
evidence, these panels could be quite helpful to courts deciding the admissibility of
controversial forensic science.
Selecting and communicating with such experts must, of course, be handled with
care, such as to avoid improper ex parte exchanges. But the greatest challenge will be to
appoint individuals who do not merely echo the unsupported claims95 under scrutiny, but
who can give real assistance to the court.
96
92. 880 F. Supp. 1027.
93. The power of courts to appoint their own expert witnesses has been codified in Fed. R. Evid. 706 and
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Daubert, where the Court recognized a trial court's ability to "procure the
assistance of an expert of its own choosing." 509 U.S. at 595. Science panels have been appointed to assist the
court in complex tort cases, notably in the silicone breast implant litigation. Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
397 F.3d 878, 881-82 (10th Cir. 2005).
94. Fed. R. Civ. P. 39.
95. Imagine appointing a committee of astrologers to evaluate astrology.
96. Courts might follow the strategy of the National Academy of Science, which, for example, in evaluating
the validity of voiceprint identification, appointed a panel consisting not only of practicing voiceprint 17
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H. Enabling the Adversary Process to Work by Facilitating Counter-Testimony
Criminal defendants typically come to court without experts, whether to challenge
admissibility in limine or to testify at trial concerning the weight to be accorded the
expert's testimony. The most obvious reason for this is a lack of funds to pay for them.
Greater availability of competing expert witnesses in cases involving forensic
identification testimony would fit well with Daubert's recognition that "presentation of
contrary evidence" is one appropriate "means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence." 9 7 For the adversary process to work, both advocates need the resources to
present their strongest case. Courts can help make the adversary process work (and work
for the court) by making such appointments more often.98
examiners but of people from other relevant fields, such as acoustical engineering, linguistics, and statistics.
97. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
98. In the long run, this would lead to improvement in forensic science because weaknesses in forensic
science are in part the result of a lack of adversarial testing of forensic science throughout most of the twentieth
century.
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